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Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas.  
—Publius Vergilius Maro, Georgicon 2. 490 
 
In jure non remota causa sed proxima spectatur.  
—Francis Bacon, The Elements of the Common Law of England, 1630 
 
This paper deals with the relationship between legal responsibility and 
causation. I argue that legal responsibility is not necessarily rooted in 
causation. My discussion deals with legal responsibility, except when I 
explicitly refer to other kinds of responsibility. 
The general claim I aim to disprove is that responsibility is descriptive 
because it is fundamentally rooted in causality, and causality is 
metaphysically real and founded. My strategy is twofold. 
First, I show (in §1) that there are significant and independent non-
causal form of responsibility that cannot be reduced to causal 
responsibility; second, in §2, I show that the very notion of causality is—
lato sensu—not plainly descriptive. I will suggest that even causation is 
tied to evaluative elements, contrary to what is assumed by many theorists 
and practitioners working in normative domains. 
 
In §3, I give a brief account of the three most discussed contributions 
to the relationship between causation and responsibility (legal and moral) 
in the last 50 years: H. Kelsen’s Society and Nature (1948), Hart and 
Honoré’s Causation in the Law (1959) and finally M. Moore’s Causation 
and Responsibility (2009). I shall consider these contributions in light of 
the thesis I defend in this work. 
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Introduction: A Bird’s Eye View 
 
In this work causation will not be dealt with as an independent topic, 
i.e. causation tout court, but always in a certain normative system; thus, I 
will not deal with causation in the domain of natural sciences.  
“Cause” is a rich and polysemic term. Just using “cause” or “causation” 
does not explain anything—arguably, in fact, not only are there different 
concepts of causation, there are also different conceptions of cause and 
causation, in different disciplines, used to advance different aims.1 
Dealing with causation in the law is a complex task due to two related 
terminological problems and not only for reasons intrinsic to the matter of 
causation. In law, there is no bijective relation between the words “cause” 
and “causation” and “cause” and “causation” themselves: each time the 
law speaks of “cause” and “causation”, it does not necessarily refer to 
cause and causation (a well-known example is, in Italian civil law, the use 
of “causa” to refer to the functions or reasons of contracts).2 Clearly, there 
is nothing special about the ambiguity of natural language employed in 
legal contexts, but we should be forewarned not to take this language at 
face value. 
We may be interested in causes with three different aims in mind. 
Those aims can significantly overlap sometimes, but can be kept separate 
for philosophical inquiries. They are: 
 
Causation1: forward-looking causation. This particular type is 
concerned with individuating future probable outcomes, given a certain 
state of affairs or a certain set of situations, i.e. “causes”. 
Causation2: backward-looking causation. This particular type is 
concerned with individuating those states of affairs or certain sets of 
situations whose prior existence necessarily (?) determine a given 
outcome. It has an explanatory aim. 
Causation3: causal responsibility. This particular type of causality is 
concerned with ascribing to an agent (not necessarily a living agent) a 
given outcome, “that his, her or its agency serves to explain and that can 
therefore plausibly be treated as part of the agency’s impact on the world 
(Honoré 2010).”3 
 
Clearly, causation is relevant in all three declensions, but while 
causation1 is probably more considered in the legislative, law-making 
process, causation2 and causation3 are those which play the prime roles in 
(criminal) courts.  
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Let us now sketch a provisional map of the possible relationships 
between responsibility and causation.4 
 
CN: Causation is necessary 
 
According to this view, causation is necessary for responsibility, but 
not sufficient. It means that one can be punished only for those offences 
one has caused, but not for all offences one has caused. This seems to be 
Moore’s view: he has to build up a complex theory of causation in order to 
be able to account for those threshold cases where apparently there are no 
traces of causation. Another vivid example of this view is Antony Duff’s 
jurisprudence, according to which causation is necessary (although not 
sufficient) for responsibility (cf. Duff 2008, 2009). 
 
CS: Causation is sufficient 
 
According to this rare view (possibly more common in tort law), one is 
liable for all offences one has caused, but not only for them. The fact that 
someone has caused an offence leads directly to responsibility, but this 
view does not exclude that there can be other foundations for 
responsibility. 
 
CNS: Causation is jointly necessary and sufficient  
 
According to this view, causation is jointly necessary and sufficient for 
responsibility. It means that one is criminally liable for all and only those 
offences he has caused. 
 
CnNnS: Causation is neither necessary nor sufficient 
 
According to this view, causation is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
responsibility. The basis for liability may be causation, but it may not be.  
I will defend this last view (that causation is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for responsibility) in the rest of this paper. 
1. First Argument: Causation is not necessary  
for responsibility 
Betrachte einmal die Vorgänge, die wir “spiele” nennen. […] Denn, wenn 
du sie anschaust, wirst du zwar nicht etwas sehen, was allen gemeinsam 
wäre, aber du wirst Ähnlichkeiten, Verwandtschaften, sehen, und zwar eine 
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ganze Reihe. [...] Wir sehen ein kompliziertes Netz von Ähnlichkeiten, die 
einander übergreifen und kreuzen. Ähnlichkeiten im Großen und Kleinen 
(Wittgenstein 2009, §66).5 
 
This section argues that responsibility is not based on causation. In 
particular, I shall point out several kinds of non-causal responsibility. The 
phenomena—legal and moral—usually grouped under the umbrella term 
of “responsibility” are so conceptually diverse that they cannot admit a 
common metaphysical basis. 
 
The paradigmatic case of (criminal) responsibility is when the mens 
rea (the mental elements of the offence, depending on the jurisdiction) and 
actus reus (the “wrong deed”) pertain to the very same individual.  
There are, however, borderline cases, when either the mens rea or the 
actus reus are missing or are scattered across different people. 
When there is criminal responsibility just for actus reus regardless of 
mens rea for any material element of the offence, common law 
jurisdictions speak of strict liability.6 In this section, I focus instead on 
other kinds of “queer” responsibility, namely those I group under the term 
“collective responsibility”. 7 While in strict liability the actus reus and the 
possible sanctions pertain to the very same individual, collective 
responsibility places the various elements (actus reus, mens rea and 
possible sanctions) across several individuals.8 
 
DEFINITION: Responsibility is collective when the actus reus, mens 
rea and possible liabilities do not pertain to the very same individual. 
 
Collective responsibility has at least three different “realizations”: (i) 
group responsibility, (ii) shared responsibility, (iii) vicarious responsibility.  
 
Group responsibility is defined as when the responsibility for actions is 
ascribed to members of that group qua group members, regardless of any 
actus reus or mens rea they could have or not have had, done or exercised. 
A paradigmatic example is, I think, the responsibility for genocide 
imputed to Nazi party members (following Nuremberg) regardless of their 
intending or knowing the plan or putting it into practice. 
 
Shared responsibility is defined as when the responsibility for actions 
is equally imputed to members of a group qua members of that group, 
assuming that all of them need to do or intend to do the action in question; 
in the absence of this, everyone is held equally liable. Group responsibility 
differs from shared responsibility because the former requires a status 
Chapter Nine 
 
 
126 
(being member of a group) regardless of any action or intention, whereas 
the latter assumes actions and intentions as prior. 
A paradigmatic example is, I think, the responsibility of cleaning a 
shared kitchen by members of an apartment block. All and individual 
members need to clean the kitchen, but it might be the case that, for 
special arrangements, only a part of the group is entrusted with this task. 
Were the kitchen unclean, all members would be held equally liable, 
regardless of previous arrangements among the parties. 
 
Vicarious responsibility is defined as when an individual is held 
responsible (and consequently presumably liable) for an actus reus 
someone else committed. Vicarious responsibility differs both from group 
responsibility and from shared responsibility because the individual held 
responsible or liable has—by definition—no bearing on the act in 
question, either factually or mentally (no actus reus nor mens rea)—
although he can (and often ought to) exercise control over those for whom 
he is vicariously responsible. 
A paradigmatic example is, I think, the vicarious responsibility of an 
employer for his employees or that of an editor-in-chief for what appears 
in his publication.9 
 
Causation is not necessary for responsibility: I have discussed three 
legitimate examples of responsibility where the ascription of responsibility 
is non-causal. In group responsibility, just being a member of a particular 
group is sufficient for being held responsibility for the (mis)deeds of the 
group, regardless of any personal causal contribution. In shared 
responsibility, there is the mens rea but not necessarily the caused actus 
reus. In vicarious responsibility, the responsible individual has no causal 
bearing on the act in question, which was committed by someone else, but 
responsibility is derived from a particular relationship or status one has. 
Despite their diversity, none of the forms of collective responsibility 
discussed in this section thus far are based on a traditional notion of 
causality. This seems the case for two reasons: first, the source of 
responsibility is not necessarily or solely individuated in agency, but rather 
in a given status of an individual or a group, a status more often than not 
resulting from normative relations; second, the causal contribution (or 
omission) of a particular individual cannot be directly linked to the actions 
for which one is punished. What one has (or has not) caused is severed 
from his responsibility. 
We have two ways out this impasse: first, to disown collective 
responsibility as an actual form of responsibility (because it is not causal-
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based)—but this would be question-begging; second, we may 
acknowledge that there are forms of responsibility de facto non causal, and 
therefore conclude that causation is not necessary for responsibility. 
 Another argument shows the conceivability of non-causal forms of 
responsibility. Within a strict consequentialist view, one can do away with 
causation—exactly as with desert: what matters is not (only) past deeds, 
but what happens next. If the state of affairs justifies placing responsibility 
(or blame, or punishment) on someone completely unrelated to the action 
in question, an act-consequentialist is prima facie compelled to accept that 
causation is not necessarily linked to responsibility (although it might 
contingently be). And since (act-)consequentialism is a legitimate (even if 
not necessarily true or correct) moral theory that can account for 
responsibility, then it is not even a conceptual truth that responsibility is 
necessarily based on causation: this would ultimately depend on the (meta-
)normative theory of values one endorsed (his Wertanschauung). 
 
In this section, I have suggested that there are many substantially 
different phenomena grouped under the umbrella term of “responsibility”—
many of which are even non-causal. None of these phenomena have 
anything descriptive (factual) in common, and thus, at least in these 
important cases, responsibility cannot be explained away by pointing to a 
(common) metaphysical, descriptive trait of the world, as causality is often 
interpreted. 
2. Second Argument: Causation in law and morals  
is not descriptive 
Wie ist denn der Begriff des Spiels abgeschlossen? Was ist noch ein Spiel 
und was ist keines mehr? Kannst du die Grenzen angeben? Nein. Du 
kannst welche ziehen: denn es sind noch keine gezogen (Wittgenstein 
2009, §68).10 
 
The scope of this section is to hold the following thesis: even if 
causation were jointly necessary and sufficient to determine responsibility, 
this would not show that responsibility is non-normative, that is, grounded 
in something ultimately descriptive.11 
The general argument can be summarized as follows: 
(i) causation is necessary for responsibility;  
(ii) causation is descriptive, or non-normative (because it is 
scientifically provable, etc.); therefore  
(iii) responsibility is necessarily descriptive, or non-normative.12 
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reject this conclusion. Even assuming (i)—which has been discussed and 
rejected in §1, showing that causation is not necessary for responsibility—
I shall show that (ii) is false, and that causation is neither descriptive nor 
non-normative.  
 
Now I shall put forward three arguments I think summarize the 
problems with premise (ii), that is, the consideration of causation (in law 
and morals) as descriptive: first, the problem of remoteness; second, what 
I call the “causal sorites”; third, the heterogeneity of actions with regard to 
omissions. The non-descriptive aspects of causation in natural sciences are 
well-known in philosophy of science. I shall assume the reader is familiar 
with this shared background and the three arguments I shall discuss are to 
provide further evidence to the thesis that causation is also non-descriptive 
in legal and moral domains.  
(i) Regressus ad infinitum/remoteness  
This problem is pretty familiar (also) to lawyers: how far should one 
go before causes become irrelevant? Several acts are jointly necessary for 
an action to happen, and these acts can be remote. Now, are these remote 
acts (still necessary for further necessary things to obtain) of legal 
relevance for the action in question?13 
Take a murder. If the killer’s mother and father had not met, this 
particular homicide would not have occurred, because—it seems, on an 
intuitive reading—this particular killer would not have existed (and so on, 
back in time). From a purely descriptive point of view, the encounter of 
the killer’s mother and father is a necessary condition for the killer’s being 
there (and eventually committing the murder) so it should be considered a 
cause, or at least part of the relevant causal chain. In a counterfactual 
analysis, if the killer’s mother and father had not met, then this killer 
would not have existed and this homicide would not have been committed. 
Now, the law (and morals) is usually not interested in this kind of “causal” 
chains. Instead, judges and lawyers are more concerned with a specifically 
legal cause, also called proximate, that is “near and immediate, or directly 
traceable, or foreseeable (Feinberg and Coleman, p. 603). The legal or 
proximate cause is called also cause-in-fact. 
Now, it seems very hard to justify such a choice on purely descriptive 
grounds. The only real difference I can think of in the murder example isa 
temporal factor—but this still does not clearly point out why more recent 
or more remote causes are to be preferred or discarded without a choice 
already made on our part. 
Please keep in mind that this argument has a specific diachronic 
dimension. 
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(ii) The causal sorites paradox  
A lesser problem—quite distinct from the “regressus ad infinitum”—is 
the causal version of the Sorite paradox: not how far back in time we 
should go to pick the relevant cause, but how much our cause has to 
contribute to (say) the offence. Let us grant that causation is 
metaphysically primitive (i.e. not reducible to other physical things or 
forces). Still, it is plausible that causation is a “scalar relation” (Moore 
2009, p. 105) and therefore a matter of degree.14 
This might be a problem with accomplice liability, if we, 
counterintuitively, admit that the accomplice has had a causal (albeit 
maybe non-physical) role in the offence. 
It is for the law (or for morals) to “draw the line”: to decide whether a 
certain degree of contribution is going to count as a cause or not. And it is 
apparent that this line is not descriptively determined, but always based on 
some sort of evaluation. 
Note that the “causal sorites” is quite different from the “regressus ad 
infinitum”: the former is a synchronic problem, while the latter is 
diachronic. 
(iii) Actions vs. omissions  
A notion of responsibility that necessarily requires a descriptive 
conception of causation has a problem with omissions. In fact, whereas 
omissions are of some importance at least for criminal responsibility, 
descriptive criteria for causation cannot easily track the intuitive 
distinction between actions and omissions. Either omissions cannot cause 
anything (and one cannot be responsible for an omission, contra the 
evidence from criminal law), or—in order to assign responsibility for 
omissions—omissions are causes: this either makes them coincide with 
actions, or escalates into counterintuitive conclusions (for example, that 
roughly the whole humanity should be held responsible for the effects of 
any omission whatsoever).  
 
Consider two situations where a person dies. Now, let us stipulate that 
situation (a), where a robber shoots a passerby, may be prima facie 
described as “killing”; another situation (b), where nourishment for a 
terminally ill patient is not provided, may be described as “letting die”. Do 
(a) and (b) differ? Moral philosophers do not agree on this problem, so let 
us keep our discussion to the legal domain. It seems that they may be 
considered different even in finer cases, for instance in the distinction 
between active and passive euthanasia, and in radically different charges 
you can incur: in Italian criminal law, (a) would possibly get you a 
sentence for “omicidio volontario” [approximately: murder] (up to 21 
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years in prison), while (b) would possibly get you a sentence for 
“omissione di soccorso” [approximately: duty to rescue] (1 year sentence 
or a 2.500-euro fine).15 If (a) and (b) were two different things (as 
criminal law seems to recognize), then a possible grounding would be 
identifying (a)—killing—with an action, and (b)—letting die—with an 
omission: actions would be causes, whereas omissions would not. On 
these grounds killing could be punished because someone actively caused 
it—in a legal (moral) framework where causation is necessary for 
responsibility. Given that, it is easy to see why in (a)—killing—one is 
responsible. But (b)—letting die—is rather puzzling. Either omissions are 
causes, in which case there should be no difference between responsibility 
for killing and letting die because the effects are the same, and the 
responsibility should be the same; or omissions are not causes, and since 
one has not caused anything with one’s omissions, no responsibility is 
warranted.16 
Carolina Sartorio (for instance cf. Sartorio 2009 and Sartorio 2012) 
argues that accepting this distinction between causal action and non-causal 
omission is an untenable position because it is metaphysically unfounded 
and because it would force us to accept absurd consequences. This is 
exemplified by the so-called “Queen of England’s problem” in terms of 
omissions: my gardener is responsible for my plants’ death, because if my 
gardener had watered my plants, they wouldn’t have died; therefore, the 
Queen of England is also responsible for my plants’ death, because, had 
she watered my plants, they wouldn’t have died.  
If we consider someone responsible for an omission, then (without 
further qualifications based on specific roles or requirements) we should 
also consider responsible all those who have not undertaken that action—
because the descriptive criteria are the same—and literally all those 
imputable according to the the relevant criteria (age, (in)sanity, and so on).  
Thus, descriptive criteria are not enough for responsibility, which 
needs non-descriptive elements to discriminate between finer alternatives. 
An independent, “descriptive” view of causation cannot convincingly 
account for the traditional (and legally relevant!) distinction between 
killing and letting die, or more generally between actions and omissions: 
the law “treats omissions both as causes and yet not as causes (Moore 
2009, p. 82).”  
 
In this section I have suggested that the very notion of causality is not 
plainly descriptive, but tied to evaluative elements.  
3. Three Views on Responsibility and Causation: Kelsen, 
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Hart and Honoré, Moore 
In this section, I give an account of the three most discussed 
contributions to the relationship between causation and responsibility 
(legal and moral) in the last 50 years: H. Kelsen’s Society and Nature 
(1948), Hart and Honoré’s Causation in the Law (1959) and finally, M. 
Moore’s Causation and Responsibility (2009). I will engage with their 
contributions with regard to the position I have developed in this work. 
3.1 Kelsen: Kausalität und Zurechnung 
Hans Kelsen (1886 – 1973), one of the major legal philosophers of the 
XX century, grappled with the problem of causation and responsibility in 
several works (cf. Kelsen 1939, 1943, 1960, 1973). 
In brief, Kelsen held that (i) imputation [Zurechnung] is the principle 
used to ascribe sanctions in normative domains; (ii) imputation, while 
being analogous of causality [Kausalität], is not based on causality; (iii) 
quite on the contrary, it is causality that, as a cultural category, stemmed 
from the principle of imputation, as the Ancient Greek word “aitía” 
indirectly shows. 
Thus, imputation (and thence responsibility) is not necessarily 
allocated on a causal basis: it may well be, but this does not have to be the 
case. 
This conclusion flows well with the rest of Kelsen’s pure theory of 
law: once we have the principle of imputation, it is for the actual laws to 
fill it with practical criteria. There is no need for responsibility to be based 
on causality. Kelsen’s position is comparable to mine, although his is 
based on other arguments and on a different perspective: arguably he has a 
Kantian understanding of causation and imputation as pertaining to two 
sharply distinct domains.  
We shall shortly see that not all legal theorists were of the same 
opinion. 
3.2 Hart and Honoré: Causation in the Law 
Published in 1959, Hart’s and Honoré’s (hereafter HH) monumental 
study Causation in the Law sought to found (normative) principles for 
attributing moral and legal responsibility upon the (descriptive) principle 
of causation. 
The principles for moral and legal responsibility are not “inventions of 
the law” but, rather, are “common-sense principles of causation” that are 
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“part of the ordinary man’s stock of general notions” and based on 
questions of fact “similar to the conventional view of the law’s use of 
other highly general notions such as those of temporal or spatial location” 
(Hart and Honoré 1959, pp. 91-92).  
HH were concerned with the concept of causation commonly used by 
ordinary people (and therefore—for them—reflected in law via ordinary 
language) rather than those used by philosophers or physicists (cf. pp. 
xxxiii-xxxiv, 1-3). 
In an extreme synthesis, HH’s argument can be summarized in the 
following way: 
(1) legal responsibility (the criteria for) is justified if it tracks (the 
criteria for) moral responsibility;17 
(2) causation is a necessary condition for moral responsibility;18 
(3) the relevant concept of causation here is the concept commonly 
used by ordinary people in speech. 
I shall rhapsodically note three problems (also problematic within 
HH’s view). 
Linguistic Analysis  
Linguistic analysis (the method chosen by HH to tackle the issue of 
causation) does not exhaust empirical and conceptual aspects of the 
problem. It is thus a dubious method to investigate such a complex task. 
Which event is a cause?  
We have seen that not all necessary conditions (for the sufficiency of 
the set) are causes. Why is that the case? Because what can be a cause is 
not natural or descriptive, but depends on the aim we have to ascribe an 
action to that agent, and is therefore the evaluative part of the process. 
Which cause is relevant?  
Once we have a list of causes for our event, we still need to choose 
those which are relevant. Think of a so-called overdetermination case. A 
fire, deliberately started by John, reached Rachel’s house and was about to 
burn it down. Suddenly, a violent earthquake made the house collapse. 
Now, both events were independently sufficient to destroy the house. 
There is an important difference, though: while the fire was lit by John 
with the purpose of destroying Rachel’s house (let us take this for 
granted), the earthquake was a natural, “extraordinary” event. 
According to HH, both the fire and the earthquake are causal relevant 
factors, because each was independently necessary for the sufficiency of 
the set of factors that destroyed Rachel’s house. 
Now, is John to pay for reparation, even though the event that 
destroyed Rachel’s house was the earthquake? It seems we must choose 
which cause is relevant for our purposes. If we adopt a mere chronological 
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criterion, the earthquake was the most recent event and therefore, perhaps, 
causally responsible. But again, this sort of relevance decision seems 
based not on purely arbitrary factors, but at least on evaluative premises. 
In the end, HH overlapped and conflated the issue of natural causation 
with the issue of responsibility-attribution. They failed to see that the 
attribution of responsibility can be non-causal, and therefore that natural 
causation and the attribution of responsibility cannot be accounted for in 
the same (causal) way.19 Natural causation and responsibility are 
different—though not unrelated—“things”.20 In this respect, HH’s position 
is quite different from the argument I adopted earlier in this paper.  
3.3 Moore: Causation and Responsibility 
I shall briefly consider the position of Michael S. Moore, expressed in 
particular in his latest book, Causation and Responsibility. I cannot 
consider Moore’s rich and complex position fully here. Thus, I shall try to 
underline and discuss the points most relevant to my thesis. 
Moore thinks, for instance, that legal responsibility should closely 
track moral responsibility,21 and that moral responsibility is based on 
natural, empirical properties such as causation, which is necessary for it 
and purely descriptive.22 
I shall now quote two brief passages and then try to formalize and 
dismantle his argument. 
 
The metaethical postulate is that moral responsibility [...] supervenes on 
natural properties like causation, intention, and the like. The postulate of 
legal theory is that legal liability (in torts and criminal law) falls only on 
those who are morally responsible (Moore 2009, p. vii; cf. also Moore 
1997). 
 
In other words, 
 
[A]ll law, on my view of it, must be based on policy [...]. This policy 
would be to attach legal liability to morally blameworthy actions. It is 
morality, not legal policy, that tells us that actions that cause harm are 
more blameworthy than those that merely attempt or risk such harm. It is 
metaphysics, not legal policy, that tells us when an action causes a certain 
harm (Moore 2009, p. 230). 
 
Moore’s argument can be roughly summarized as follows: 
(i) moral responsibility depends (necessarily but partially) on 
causation, and since  
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(ii.a) criminal liability (and lato sensu criminal law) is based on moral 
responsibility, and since 
(ii.b) criminal liability (and lato sensu criminal law) ought to be based 
on moral responsibility, then 
(iii) criminal liability substantially depends on causation, and  
(iv) criminal liability ought to (i.e. it is justified to) depend on 
causation. 
I do not think Moore’s reasoning sound, and I reject both conclusion 
(iii) and (iv), for two key reasons. First, even granting both premises (ii.a) 
and (ii.b) for argument’s sake,23 I have argued (in §1) that premise (i) is 
false: responsibility in general is not necessarily based on causation—even 
if it may be contingently based on causation. Second, Moore’s 
understanding of causation (in law and morals) as naturalistically justified 
is fundamentally wrong— as I have argued in §2. 
To compare HH’s argument, here is Moore’s version: 
(1) legal responsibility (the criteria for) is justified if it tracks moral 
responsibility (the criteria for); 
(2) causation is a necessary condition for moral responsibility;24 
(3) the relevant concept of causation here is NOT the concept 
commonly used by ordinary people in speech. A careful metaphysics 
theory of causation is needed to justify moral and legal doctrines. 
For Moore, all responsibilities must be causal. Therefore, he has 
almost no choice: either his theory is factually disproved, or those non-
causal responsibilities (vicarious responsibility, accomplice liability) must 
not be considered proper cases of responsibility. The latter is precisely his 
strategy. 
The following paragraph is devoted to showing how Moore ignores the 
facts (the reality of accomplice, non-causal liability) to fit his theory (no 
liability/responsibility without causation). 
 
Accomplice Liability  
The key test for the notion of causation, both in the law and in 
metaphysics, is to account for accomplice liability. Obviously, an 
accomplice is a person who, it is presumed, helps or instigates the 
wrongdoer to commit the crime. However, the extent to which the 
accomplice’s contribution is a causal contribution is open to question. 
It is plausible to think this instigation requires both an actus reus and a 
mens rea to be considered accomplice liability.25 Leaving aside the actus 
reus requirement, is mens rea limited to knowledge (of possible 
consequences) or could it possibly require purpose (the purpose of helping 
the future wrongdoer)? And must there be an intention to merely help the 
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future wrongdoer, or an intention to bring about the criminal offence, 
directly or indirectly via the wrongdoer? Unfortunately, Moore limits his 
discussion only to the actus reus requirement. 
Moore seeks to abandon the accomplice liability doctrine. Why? I try 
to summarize (and, alas, somewhat simplify) his argument here: 
(i) The attribution of responsibility (here, liability) must be strictly 
causal;26 
(ii) An accomplice has a causal role only in HH’s intervening cause 
sense; 
(iii) HH’s idea of intervening causes is metaphysically unfounded and 
should be abandoned; 
(iv) The role of an accomplice cannot be causal (with regards to the 
offence) in any sound metaphysical sense. 
Therefore: 
(v) There must be no accomplice liability.27  
But accomplice liability is a perfectly accepted form of (at least legal) 
responsibility, and since there are great difficulties in interpreting 
accomplice liability in causal terms, it seems advisable to forgo the causal 
requirement, as I argue in this paper. 
 
Causation in law (and morals)  
In the last part of his book, Moore finally tackles the “beast”: the 
metaphysical notion of cause (causality). His analysis is, roughly, split into 
two parts: (a) an analysis of causal relata and (b) an analysis of the causal 
relation. In other words, accounting for what causation is (“counterfactual 
dependence, nomic sufficiency, probabilistic dependence, regular 
concurrence, something else or nothing at all (p. 327)”) is quite different 
from (yet related to) accounting for the entities causation links (“events, 
aspects of events, facts, negative events (p. 327)”). 
(a) Causal relata: a deontic fallacy  
As for (a): causal relata, we start to notice a crack in his mechanism. 
He loosely argues for a distinction between metaphysics and the law. In 
metaphysics, the true causal relata are “fine-grained” things: states of 
affairs. Instead, 
 
the relation most desirable for use in law is different: (coarse-grained) 
events are the relata on which legal liability should turn, recognizing that 
such relata will be constructions based on the true relata of the causal 
relations, which are states of affairs (p. ix, emphasis added). 
 
Now, let me just put forward two informal objections: 
First, from the basic descriptive level we creep into the domain of the 
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normative. He said that we need an objective, descriptive account of the 
metaphysics of causation and causal relata (as fine-grained states of 
affairs) and then he changes his mind and builds up new causal relata 
especially for the law, as the above quotation shows. Why? Because this 
relation is “most desirable for use in law”. Those two different theories 
seem neither equivalent nor interchangeable. He simply appears to pick 
the most convenient, regardless of which is true.  
Second and more generally, he commits a deontic fallacy:28 the fact 
that something is desirable or should obtain (for instance, responsibility 
ought to be based on causation) determines our thinking that the world is 
as it should be (we select the relata so that responsibility is based on 
causation, and all other non-causal forms of responsibility—such as 
accomplice liability—do not exist).  
 (b) The nature of causation  
As for (b): the nature of causation, (see pp. x-xi and part IV) the 
confusion continues. Moore identifies law’s causal theory as 
counterfactual dependence.29 For the law, counterfactual dependence 
(roughly, the thesis that c is a cause of offence y iff y would not have 
occurred if c had not occurred) is both necessary and sufficient for 
causation. 
Moore adopts a twofold (and inconsistent) strategy: first, he provides 
us with a series of reasons and argument against both the sufficiency and 
the necessity of counterfactual dependence for causation (citing, among 
other things, the existence of non-causal counterfactuals, the need to 
consider omissions as causes, overdetermination, etc.): counterfactual 
dependence and causation are not the same thing; but second, he 
confidently argues that counterfactual dependence is a legal and moral 
“desert-determiner independent of causation (p. 426).” This is to say that 
blameworthiness (and mutatis mutandis liability) depends not (only) on 
causation but (also?) on counterfactual dependence. How and when? 
Moore presents us with counterintuitive cases, such as symmetrical and 
asymmetrical overdetermination (see Sartorio, 2012) and blameworthiness 
for omissions and preventions—cases that can hardly be accountable in 
terms of non-counterfactual causation. There, counterfactual dependence 
occurs without causation, and Moore wants to assign liability without 
causation. 
For this last section on causation and counterfactual dependence, I 
shall adopt the so-called charity principle in reading Moore’s theory. 
Above, we have seen that Moore’s idea is that causation is necessary for 
responsibility (liability). Then, we saw how desert is often determinable 
only by using a criterion of counterfactual dependence; but we have seen 
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how—according to Moore—counterfactual dependence neither is, nor 
implies, causation. 
Now, I would prima facie say that there is a non-sequitur in Moore’s 
argumentation. But on a more charitable reading, we might try to apply the 
familiar, legal distinction between conviction and sentence. In this way, 
causation is necessary for conviction (i.e., the attribution of 
responsibility/liability); counterfactual dependence determines, instead, 
the (severity of the) sentence—even if I cannot say the extent to which 
counterfactual dependence would be either sufficient or necessary for the 
sentence. 
But in the end, I think Moore’s arguments are simply untenable. Just 
one example is as follows. We have seen that: 
(a) He considers causation necessary for responsibility/liability;  
(b) He repeatedly states that “omissions cannot be causes” (p. 444); 
(c) He thinks that there must be liability for omissions (pp. 444ff.) 
And these three premises are simply inconsistent. If (b) holds, than we 
must discard either (a), so that causation is not necessary for 
responsibility/liability, or (c), that is, we cannot attribute liability for 
omissions, since (b), they cannot be causes. 
I do not think Moore’s reasoning sound and I have rejected both 
conclusion (iii) (liability necessarily depends on causation) and (iv) 
(liability must depend on causation). Besides the two main reasons given 
above (responsibility in general is not necessarily based on causation; and 
causation is not simply “out there”), in this last section I have argued that 
Moore’s reasoning is, at the very least, inconsistent, as the case of 
omissions shows. 
4. To sum up 
I have argued that causation is neither necessary for responsibility, nor 
convincingly descriptive. I have suggested that, although based on 
physical, empirical evidence, both law and morals need to draw a line 
based on evaluative considerations. 
To sum up, I hope to have disproved the claim that responsibility is 
ultimately descriptive because it is fundamentally rooted in causality, and 
causality is descriptive. My strategy was twofold. I put forward two 
arguments: First, I showed that there are significant and independent non-
causal forms of responsibility that cannot be reduced to causal 
responsibility; second, I showed that the very notion of causality (in law 
and morals) is—lato sensu—normative, or at least non plainly descriptive. 
Empirical research might tell us where to look to find causes, but it 
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will not indicate which causes are relevant in order to ascribe 
responsibility—or, in other words, where to draw the line.30 
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Notes 
                                                            
1 For evidence bearing on this point, see my discussion of “aitía”—meaning both 
“guilt” and “cause”—in Faroldi (2014, p. 4–5). I will not go into the metaphysical 
discussion on causality here, but will only be concerned with the “zoom-level” of 
inquiry employed in legal and moral philosophy. 
2 Cf. Italian Civil Code, artt. 1325, 1343–45. 
3 For similar remarks, see Hart (2008) and Feinberg (1965, 1970). 
4 The matter is complicated because we have (at least) three unknowns, so to 
speak: moral responsibility, criminal responsibility and causation. A general and 
convincing theory must, of course, fully take into account the relationships 
between all three unknowns.  
5 “Consider the activities we call “games”. For if you look at them, you won’t see 
something that is common to all, but similarities, affinities, and a whole series of 
them at that. We see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-
crossing. Similarities in the large and in the small” (Wittgenstein 2009, §66). 
6 ‘Regardless’ here means that (i) there are no mens rea elements required for the 
offense to take place; (ii) mental elements are irrelevant for the offence. Of course 
mens rea and fault are not the same thing, as I pointed out in (Faroldi 2014, p. 92 
and passim). 
7 For the concept (and consequences) of collective moral responsibility, see for 
instance Arendt (1987); Feinberg (1968); Smiley (2011); Benjamin (1976, 1998); 
Bobzien (2006); Braham and van Hees (2012); Caruso (forthcoming); Corlett 
(2001); Fischer (2006, 2012); Gilbert (2006); Graham (2006); Isaacs (2006, 2011); 
Mäkelä (2007); Miller (2001a, 2001b, 2006); Miller and Mäkelä (2005); Nahmias 
et al. (2005); Nelkin (2007); Risser (2009); Sheehy (2006); Shoemaker (2009); 
Silver (2006); Soares (2003); Tollefsen (2003); Velasquez (2003); Williams 
(2006). 
8 For a systematic analysis and classification of various forms of non-standard 
responsibility, see Faroldi (2013). 
9 Accomplice and corporate responsibility are examples of non-personal 
responsibility. On the moral significance of corporate responsibility, see Dubbink 
and Smith (2011); French (1984); Garrett (1989); González (2002); Graham 
(2001); G. Moore (1999); Risser (1985); Silver (2006); Smith (forthcoming); 
Soares (2003); Velasquez (2003); Welch (1992); Wilmot (2001). Corporate social 
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responsibility seems to me a very complex and interesting form of responsibility (if 
it is a case of responsibility stricto sensu, of course), but I will not deal with it in 
this work; cf. for instance Azzoni (2004, 2012). Accomplice responsibility will be 
dealt with in §3.3. 
10 For how is the concept of game bounded? What still count as a game, and what 
no longer does? Can you say where the boundaries are? No. You can draw some, 
for there aren’t any drawn yet (Wittgenstein 2009, §68). 
11 For both subjective and objective limitations, I shall not be concerned here with 
a critique of the general, metaphysical notion of “causation”. This section’s title 
might also read as “Moral and Legal Causation as Normative”. 
12 A similar argument is made by Moore (2009). On this, see infra at §3.3. 
13 Here, I am using the terms “act”, “action” and “event” in non-technical senses. 
14 For the general problem of vagueness, see at least Williamson (1994). 
15 The Italian penal code (art. 40.2) states (stipulates, prescribes?) that omissions 
are (to be considered/count as?) causes: “[...] Non impedire un evento, che si ha 
l’obbligo giuridico di impedire, equivale a cagionarlo.” 
16 I thank Fabio Bacchini for specific discussion on this point. 
17 Needless to say, they need not be coincident: “we must bear in mind the many 
factors which must differentiate moral from legal responsibility in spite of their 
partial correspondence [...]. [T]he fact that the individuals have a type of [causal] 
connection with harm which is adequate for moral censure or claims for 
compensation is only one of the factors which the law must consider” (p. 66). 
18 “[D]oing or causing harm constitutes not only the most usual but the primary 
type of ground for holding persons responsible in [this] sense.” (p. 65, emphasis 
added). 
19 For a parallel reading of HH, cf. Wright (2008, p. 177): “They insisted that the 
principles of attributable responsibility should be treated as causal rather than 
noncausal principles. They seem to assume that in order to avoid ad hoc, policy-
driven determinations of attributable responsibility, the principles of attributable 
responsibility (beyond the basic natural causation principle) must be ‘causal’ 
principles”. 
20 The classical debate in (at least common) law was dominated by minimalist 
works (holding that the criteria for the attribution of responsibility are neither 
objective nor causal) such as Posner (1972, 1973) and by maximalists (holding that 
there are factual causal criteria for attributing responsibility) such as Epstein 
(1973). 
21 The postulate of legal theory is that legal liability (in torts and criminal law) falls 
only on those who are morally responsible Moore (2009, p. vii). 
22 “The nature of causation—what causation is—is a matter of fact, inviting 
theoretical speculation”. Causation is “a real relationship in the world”—cf. 
(Moore 2009), passim. For a position different from both mine and Moore’s, see 
Stapleton (2008, 2009): for her, the notion of cause in legal settings must be 
“untainted by normative controversies”. 
23 I have shown elsewhere (cf. Faroldi 2014) that premises (ii.a) and (ii.b) are to be 
rejected. Briefly, I considered an argument from formalization (if criminal 
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liabilities were to be based ultimately (or informally) on moral responsibility, and 
moral responsibility depends on moral theories that are usually hard to formalize 
and codify (because they are subject to inter-community negotiation, emotion-
based judgments and other peculiar traits), then there would be problems in 
drawing legal provisions—however indirectly—from moral theories); an argument 
from disagreement (on which moral theory should our concept of criminal 
responsibility be based?); and an argument from the judges’ discretionality (if 
there was no agreed theory of moral responsibility, criminal legal systems could 
hardly be based upon a varying and inconsistent set of norms. The attribution of 
criminal liability would depend eventually on the moral system endorsed by the 
judge). 
24 “[A]bsence of causation eliminates responsibility (by licensing consequentialist 
justifications), rather than merely reducing it (when justifications are not in issue)” 
(p. 77). 
25 As many criminal statuses do—cf. Model Penal Code. 
26 Vide supra for my account of Moore’s justification of this argument. 
27 Please note that I cannot expand on Moore’s follow-ups on the topic here. 
28 On which, see Faroldi (2012). A deontic fallacy is deriving in some way an “is” 
from an “ought”, for instance by acknowledging the reality of something not as it 
is, but how it should be. 
29 I cannot go into details about counterfactual dependence here. In sum, this view 
descends from this much quoted passage in Hume (1748, p. 87): First definition: 
“We may define a cause to be an object followed by another, and where all the 
objects, similar to the first, are followed by objects similar to the second.” Second 
definition: “Or, in other words where, if the first object had not been, the second 
never had existed” (emphasis added for the definition of counterfactual 
dependence). In this quoted passage, Hume equated a regularist and a 
counterfactual (in italics) view of causation: these views are not extensionally 
equivalent. This equation is problematic, as noted, for instance, by Beebee (2013). 
For a general interpretation of causality and responsibility in Hume, see Russell 
(1995, 2008). Counterfactual dependence has recently been widely questioned in 
philosophy in general and ethics in particular, following Frankfurt (1969), who 
argued for a non-counterfactual-based attribution of responsibility. 
30 For helpful discussion and comments on previous drafts of this work, I thank 
Fabio Bacchini, Amedeo G. Conte, Guglielmo Feis, Sergio Filippo Magni and a 
reviewer. Part of this work was done during a research stay at Trinity College, 
Dublin, on an Erasmus EU grant. 
